Pace Law Review
Volume 35
Issue 3 Spring 2015

Article 7

April 2015

Thicker Than Water: America’s Addiction to Cheap Flood
Insurance
Jeffrey Valacer

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
Part of the Insurance Law Commons, and the Land Use Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jeffrey Valacer, Thicker Than Water: America’s Addiction to Cheap Flood Insurance, 35 Pace L.
Rev. 1050 (2015)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/7
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more
information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

Thicker Than Water:
America’s Addiction to Cheap
Flood Insurance
By Jeffrey Valacer*
I.

Introduction

On the evening of October 29, 2012, Hurricane Sandy made
landfall in southern New Jersey, with impacts felt across more
than a dozen states.1 During Sandy’s immediate aftermath,
more than 23,000 people sought refuge in temporary shelters,
and more than 8.5 million utility customers lost power.2 The
storm flooded numerous roads and tunnels, blocked
transportation corridors, and deposited extensive debris along
the coastline.3 A year later, more than $7.9 billion in National
Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”) payments had been made to
policy holders.4 In January 2013, Congress passed legislation to
temporarily increase NFIP’s borrowing authority by $9.7 billion,
from $20.7 billion to $30.4 billion to address these claims.5 The
NFIP is in dire financial straits. Hurricane Katrina-related
claims alone had put the NFIP at an $18 billion deficit. As of
July 2013, following payments to policy holders for Hurricane
Sandy-related claims, the NFIP was $24 billion in debt to the
United States Treasury.6
*Pace University, J.D.; Fordham University, B.A/M.A. I would like to thank
Professor Andrew Lund for his thoughtful feedback and advice on this piece,
and my mother for her continued support in all I do.
1. Hurricane Sandy: One Year Later, FEMA (Oct. 15, 2013),
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/13829671737777411aa1b6d729a8a97e84dbba62083d8/FEMA%20Sandy%20One%20Year%20
Fact%20Sheet_508.pdf.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-283, HIGH-RISK SERIES: AN
UPDATE (2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/652133.pdf.
6. National Flood Insurance Program: Continued Attention Needed to
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As will be seen, an analysis of the history of the NFIP and
recent litigation surrounding short-lived reforms which sought
to correct massive deficits in the program shows the political
volatility of flood insurance in America. Without actuarial
principles guiding the program, the program is all but
guaranteed a bleak fiscal outlook given budgetary and
environmental concerns.
This paper is broken down into three parts. Part I traces
the history and evolution of flood insurance in the United States,
including the establishment of federal flood insurance and key
reforms over the 20th and 21st centuries. Part II discusses the
2012 flood insurance reform package, subsequent legal
challenges to the reforms, and the government’s response to
political pressure over the reform. Part III concludes discussing
the continued need for flood insurance reform, especially in a
world of rising sea levels and more frequent, stronger weather
events.
II.
A.

A Brief History of the National Flood Insurance Program
The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968

The NFIP was established when Congress passed the
National Flood Insurance Act (“NFIA”) in 1968.7 The NFIP is a
federally-subsidized program, part of an effort to create
affordable flood insurance for those living in flood-prone areas.8
Congress created this program to remedy the fact that flood
insurance was not readily available from private insurance
companies.9 It was the result of decades of failed attempts by
the United States to physically restrain floodwaters with levees,
floodways, reservoirs and other physical structures, all at great
Address Challenges Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Economic Policy of
the Committee On Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 4 (2013)
(statement of Alicia Puente Cackley, Director, Financial Markets and
Community Investment Team, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/657939.pdf.
7. National Flood Insurance, Pub. L. No. 90-448, Title XIII, § 1302, 82.
Stat. 572 (1968).
8. Id.
9. Quyhn T. Pham, The Future of the National Flood Insurance Program
in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 629, 630 (2006).
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expense.10 The impetus to pass the NFIP came in reaction to the
escalating costs of ad hoc post-disaster relief legislation,
triggered initially by the Alaska earthquake of 1964, and
followed by severe flooding and damage from Hurricane Betsy in
1965, America’s first billion dollar hurricane.11 Additionally, the
NFIP was implemented in the midst of a remarkable population
shift to hurricane-vulnerable states and coastal counties.12 For
example, since 1950, Florida’s astounding 579% growth rate was
the highest in the nation, raising it from 20th to 4th in
population.13 The NFIP was a congressional response that
specifically sought to manage development in floodplains and
encourage state and local governments to “constrict the
development of land which is exposed to flood damage.”14 The
NFIP enables property owners in participating communities to
purchase insurance as a protection against flood losses in
exchange for state and community floodplain management
regulations that reduce future flood damages.15 Participation in
the NFIP is based on an agreement between communities and
the federal government.16 Flood insurance is made available
within a community when it adopts and enforces a floodplain
management ordinance to reduce future flood risk to new
construction in floodplains.17 Given the NFIP’s origin and
mission there was practically a guarantee that politics would
play a large role in its administration. Indeed, in the years
immediately following the creation of the NFIP there was
pressure to expand coverage directly from real estate and
construction interests—as well as municipalities looking to

10. Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance
Program and Louisiana, 60 TUL. L. REV. 61, 64-65 (1985).
11. Scott Gabriel Knowles & Howard C. Kunreuther, Troubled Waters:
The National Flood Insurance Program in Historical Perspective, 26 J. POL’Y
HIST. 327, 327 (2014).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(e)(1)-(2) (2012).
15. THOMAS L. HAYES & SHAMA S. SABADE, FEMA, NATIONAL FLOOD
INSURANCE PROGRAM: ACTUARIAL RATE REVIEW 2 (2004), available at
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1554-204907222/rate_rev04.pdf.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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sustain tax revenues through development.18
It was a matter of legislative finding that floods lead to
personal hardships and economic distress which in turn require
sharing the risk of flood losses through a national program of
flood insurance.19 Congress also found that “it is in the public
interest for persons already living in flood-prone areas to have
both an opportunity to purchase flood insurance and access to
more adequate limits of coverage, so that they will be
indemnified, for their losses in the event of future flood
disasters.”20 The Act originally provided subsidized insurance
only to properties already existing at the time the area within
which they were located was identified as a Special Flood
Hazard Area (“SFHA”).21
As the Army Corps of Engineers went about its work of
assessing and mapping hazards in the early days, it might find
a community to have a greater than 1% chance in any given year
of a serious flood.22 Communities in these zones were deemed to
be SFHAs, and this designation placed the community under
pressure to pass ordinances restricting floodplain development
or lose NFIP eligibility.23 Faced with restricting development or
taking chances on a hurricane and hoping for disaster relief
payments, many communities in the early years of the NFIP
chose to take their chances.24
When category five Hurricane Camille hit the Gulf Coast in
August 1969 (259 killed, $1.4 billion in losses) only two
communities (Fairbanks, Alaska and Metairie, Louisiana) were
participating in the NFIP.25 Only two more communities would
be deemed eligible by the end of 1969.26 This dismal state led
Congress to amend the program and allow communities that had
not yet been mapped for flood hazard or had actuarial rates
18. Knowles & Kunreuther, supra note 11, at 336-37.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(a)(1)-(4).
20. Id. § 4002(a)(6).
21. Saul Jay Singer, Flooding the Fifth Amendment: The National Flood
Insurance Program and the “Takings” Clause, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 323,
336 (1990).
22. Knowles & Kunreuther, supra note 11, at 336-37.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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computed to join on an “emergency” basis as long they accepted
floodplain development controls on new construction.27 This socalled “St. Germain Amendment” lowered the time from
application to certification from 9-12 months to 3 weeks, and
brought in 154 new communities (5,500 policies) by mid-1970.28
B.

The Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973

As just shown, a major defect of the original NFIP was its
failure to associate federal assistance with the purchase of flood
insurance.29 At the time, the lack of participation by eligible
homeowners was primarily fueled by their reliance upon federal
disaster assistance “to finance their recovery.”30 While Congress
could not force homeowners to purchase flood insurance31 they
were able to force participation by using spending powers to
establish federally-backed mortgages.32 The Flood Disaster
Protection Act of 1973 required federal financial regulatory
agencies to adopt regulations prohibiting their regulated lending
institutions from making, increasing, extending or renewing a
loan secured by improved real estate or a mobile home located
or to be located in a SFHA in a community participating in the
NFIP unless property securing the loan was covered by flood
insurance.33 Flood insurance became mandatory for anyone
wanting to obtain federally-backed mortgages in high risk flood
zones. The Act also made federal financial assistance for
construction in flood hazard areas contingent upon the purchase
of flood insurance.34 The Act had the intended effect of
increasing enrollment in the NFIP and within seven years
nearly every community with flood hazards agreed to join the
program.35
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Singer, supra note 21, at 336.
30. Rachel Lisotta, In Over Our Heads: The Inefficiencies of the National
Flood Insurance Program and the Institution of Federal Tax Incentives, 10 LOY.
MAR. L.J. 511, 517 (2012).
31. Id. at 517.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 515.
34. Singer, supra note 21, at 337.
35. Pham, supra note 9, at 632.
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Creation of the “Write Your Own” Program

Language in the original 1968 statute provided that the
national flood insurance program was “to the maximum extent
practicable,” intended to encourage and arrange for financial
participation and risk sharing program by insurance companies
and others. Specifically, the 1968 Act stated:
In administering the flood insurance program
under this subchapter, the Administrator is
authorized to enter into any contracts,
agreements, or other appropriate arrangements
which may, from time to time, be necessary for the
purpose of utilizing, on such terms and conditions
as may be agreed upon, the facilities and services
of any insurance companies or other insurers,
insurance agents and brokers, or insurance
adjustment organizations; and such contracts,
agreements, or arrangements may include
provision for payment of applicable operating
costs and allowances for such facilities and
services as set forth in the schedules prescribed
under section 4018 of this title.36
In 1983 Congress took the necessary steps to carry out this
statutory authority by implementing the “Write Your Own”
(“WYO”) program through FEMA37 regulations.38 Under WYO,
private sector insurers market flood insurance with the federal
government acting as guarantor and reinsurer.39 The WYO
program is a cooperative undertaking of the insurance industry
and FEMA.40 It allows participating property and casualty
36. 42 U.S.C. § 4018 (2012).
37. From 1968 until 1979, the NFIP was administered by the Department
of Housing and Urban Development. Beginning in 1979, FEMA assumed
control. See AM. INST. FOR RESEARCH ET AL., A CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS
AFFECTING THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 28 (2002).
38. See 44 C.F.R. §§ 62.23-.24 (2009).
39. Singer, supra note 21, at 337.
40. What
Is
the
Write
Your
Own
Program?,
FEMA,
http://www.fema.gov/national-flood-insurance-program/what-write-your-ownprogram (last visited Apr. 8, 2015).
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insurance companies to write and service the Standard Flood
Insurance Policies (“SFIPs”) of the NFIP in their own names.41
The companies receive an expense allowance for policies written
and claims processed while the Federal Government retains
responsibility for underwriting losses.42 The WYO program
operates as part of the NFIP, and is subject to its rules and
regulations.43 Insurance agents serve as the agent of record
between the insured and the NFIP, thus the NFIP does not
employ agents to broker or to service the flood insurance
policies.44 Implementation of WYO resulted in a drastic increase
in the number of NFIP policies.45 From 1985 to 2004, the
number of NFIP policies rose from 2 million to 4.7 million in
about 20,000 communities.46
D. The National Flood Insurance Act of 1994
The National Flood Insurance Act of 1994 imposed the
requirement that an institution, or servicer acting on its behalf,
upon discovering that security property is not covered by an
adequate amount of flood insurance, must, after providing notice
and an opportunity for the borrower to obtain the necessary
amount of flood insurance, purchase flood insurance in the
appropriate amount on the borrower’s behalf.47 Therefore, even
those individuals who do not voluntarily purchase flood
insurance through the NFIP are effectively in the NFIP
marketplace since their lenders will “force place” the insurance
and factor the cost of this insurance into the borrower’s monthly
payments.48 This means that there is no effective “opt out” for
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Lisotta, supra note 30, at 515.
45. Pham, supra note 9, at 633.
46. Id.
47. FDIC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL: FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT V-6.5 (2014),
available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/compliance/manual/pdf/V-6.1.pdf.
48. There has been recent controversy with banks inflating premiums for
force-placed insurance. See David McAfee, Citibank to Pay $110M in ForcePlaced Insurance Settlement, LAW360 (Feb. 5, 2014 8:54 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/507490; Allissa Wickham, Wells Fargo Settles
Force-Placed Insurance Class Action, LAW360 (Mar. 5, 2014 7:41 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/515666/wells-fargo-settles-force-placed-
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those who do not fully own their flood-prone properties. Indeed,
the NFIP expressly prohibits federally-regulated lending
institutions from making real estate loans in special flood
hazard areas if the property is not covered by a flood insurance
policy.49 Congress also amended the NFIA to provide that new
contracts for flood insurance coverage and any modifications to
coverage under existing contracts would become effective on
expiration of a 30-day period.50
Additionally, the 1994 reforms introduced the identifying
term “repetitive loss structure” and defined it to mean “a
structure covered by a contract for flood insurance under this
title that has incurred flood-related damage on two occasions
during a 10-year period ending on the date of the event for which
a second claim is made, in which the cost of repair, on the
average, equaled or exceeded 25% of the value of the structure
at the time of each such flood event.”51
E.

The Bunning-Bereuter-Blumenauer
Reform Act of 2004

Flood

Insurance

Still, after various forms of financial incentivizing, quasiprivatization, and outright penalization, many residences in
floodplains remained uninsured.52 The most important aspect of
the 2004 Reform Act was the identification of “repetitive-loss
insurance-class-action.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(b) (2012).
50. National Flood Insurance Act, Pub. L. No. 103-325, Tit. V, § 579, 108
Stat. 2160 (1993). Prior to this, the NFIP required only a five-day waiting
period between the purchase of coverage and its effective date. See Christine
A. Klein & Sandra B. Zellmer, Mississippi River Stories: Lessons from a
Century of Unnatural Disasters, 60 SMU L. REV. 1471, 1493-94 (2007). This
allowed property owners to “track” approaching floodwaters and purchase
insurance at the last minute. Id. In 1993, in Chesterfield, Missouri, owners of
corporations behind a levee rushed to buy flood insurance just in time to beat
the five-day waiting period required before being eligible for insurance
benefits. Id. When the levee collapsed, sixty-seven claims were filed in the
area behind the levee, totaling $13.2 million. Chesterfield residents received
a financial windfall in the form of federal insurance payouts. Id.
51. § 512(a), 108 Stat. 2160.
52. Lisotta, supra note 30, at 518 (“[A] study in 2005 indicated [eightyfour percent] of residents in flood-prone areas had not purchased flood
insurance—although nearly half were supposed to have purchased it by law.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/7
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properties,” which were defined as “a property that had
experienced two or more flood losses within a 10-year period
where each loss exceeded $1,000.”53 These properties were
wreaking havoc on the NFIP. Indeed, they comprised only
approximately 1% of insured properties but were expected to
account for 25 to 30% of claims losses.54 Therefore, the 2004
reforms addressed mitigation efforts for homeowners and
eligible communities in an attempt to stop reoccurring claims for
These efforts included buyouts,
the same properties.55
elevations, relocations, or flood-proofing in hopes of producing
savings for policyholders and taxpayers through reduced losses
and disaster assistance.56
Concerns over repetitive-loss properties were answered by
including a new section to the NFIA entitled “Pilot Program for
Mitigation of Severe Repetitive Loss Properties.”57 For purposes
of the new section the concept of a “severe repetitive loss
property” was defined in the example of “a property consisting
of one to four residences to mean a property covered under an
NFIP contract for flood insurance that had incurred floodrelated damage for which four or more separate claims payments
had been made with the amount of each exceeding $5,000 and
the cumulative amount of those claims payments exceeding
$20,000 or for which at least two separate claims payments had
been made with the cumulative amount exceeding the value of
the property.”58
F.

NFIP Legal Construction

States have traditionally retained many controls over the
insurance industries operating within their jurisdictions. State
legislatures set broad policy for the regulation of insurance.59
53. National Flood Insurance Act, Pub. L. No. 108-264, § 2(3), 118 Stat.
712 (2004).
54. See id. § 2(6); Lisotta, supra note 30, at 519.
55. Lisotta, supra note 30, at 519
56. § 2(9), 118 Stat. 712.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 4102a (2012).
58. § 102(a), 118 Stat. 712.
59. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’R, STATE INSURANCE REGULATION HISTORY,
PURPOSE
AND
STRUCTURE
(2011),
available
at
http://www.naic.org/documents/topics_white_paper_hist_ins_reg.pdf.
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They establish and oversee state insurance departments,
regularly review and revise state insurance laws, and approve
regulatory budgets.60 States’ tax premiums of commercial
insurers oversee the financial solvency of insurers, require the
filing of policy forms with a state insurance regulatory agency,
and regulate insurance marketing and claims practices.61 Each
state has a department of insurance and an insurance
commissioner who is usually a cabinet-level officer responsible
for overseeing that state’s insurance regulatory operation.62
Under the NFIA, however, state insurance law is
preempted by federal law and FEMA regulations due to the
federal nature of flood insurance. As the NFIA makes clear:
In the event the program is carried out as
provided in section 4071 of this title, the
Administrator shall be authorized to adjust and
make payment of any claims for proved and
approved losses covered by flood insurance, and
upon the disallowance by the Administrator of
any such claim, or upon the refusal of the claimant
to accept the amount allowed upon any such
claim, the claimant, within one year after the date
of mailing of notice of disallowance or partial
disallowance by the Administrator, may institute
an action against the Administrator on such claim
in the United States district court for the district
in which the insured property or the major part
thereof shall have been situated, and original
exclusive jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon
such court to hear and determine such action
without regard to the amount in controversy.63
As the above text shows, Congress conferred exclusive
federal court jurisdiction over all disputes arising out of the
NFIP. The courts have widely acknowledged that the NFIA
60. Id.
61. See id. at 2-5.
62. See Map of NAIC States & Jurisdictions, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS,
http://www.naic.org/state_web_map.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2015).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 4072 (2012).
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authorized FEMA to promulgate regulations to preempt state
law claims made against issues related to the NFIP.64
Additionally, courts have interpreted this preemption broadly,
placing limited ability on a party to sue FEMA for disputes
arising out of NFIP claims handling.65 Courts have also held
that the NFIA creates no private cause of action.66 Courts have
interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 4072 as a limited waiver of sovereign
immunity to be construed narrowly.67

64. See Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co., 415 F.3d 384, 390 (5th Cir. 2005)
(“[S]tate law tort claims arising from claims handling by a WYO are preempted
by federal law.”); Davis v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 811 F. Supp. 2d 1240,
1248 (E.D. Va. 2011) (holding that that federal law preempts state law, not
only with respect to policy interpretation and claims handling under the NFIP,
but also with respect to policy issuance and administration, including the
rating, renewal, transfer, non-renewal, cancellation, or reformation of any
SFIP contract issued by a WYO Company on behalf of the NFIP); TAF, LLC v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 549 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1289 (D. Colo. 2008) (holding that
bad faith breach claims are state law tort claims based on the handling of the
claim, and therefore preempted by NFIA); Scritchfield v. Mut. of Omaha Ins.
Co., 341 F. Supp. 2d 675, 680 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (determining that FEMA
effectively preempted all state law claims by revising the language of the
SFIP); Pecarovich v. Allstate Ins. Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 981, 987 (C.D. Cal. 2003)
(stating that “an express preemption provision” has been added to policies
under the NFIP), rev'd on other grounds, 135 Fed. Appx. 23, 26 (9th Cir. 2005);
Friedman v. S.C. Ins. Co., 855 F. Supp. 348, 350 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (holding that
Federal common and statutory law preempts state contract law for purpose of
interpretation of insurance policies issued pursuant to National Flood
Insurance Act).
65. See Gunter v. Farmers Ins. Co., 736 F.3d 768, 772-73 (8th Cir. 2013)
(holding that the reference to federal common law in insureds’ SFIP only
required courts to look to standard principles of interpreting insurance
contracts when resolving questions about coverage, not to expand available
remedies or causes of action); Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co., 500 F.3d 390, 398
(5th Cir. 2007) (Wright II ) (holding that plaintiff's “extra-contractual claims
for fraud and negligent misrepresentation are neither explicitly nor implicitly
authorized by the NFIA” and therefore dismissing federal common law claims);
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 572 F. Supp. 2d 664, 668 (E.D. La.
2008) (concluding that the insureds' extra-contractual claim alleging breach of
fiduciary duty against the WYO insurer based on the calculation of SFIP rates
was preempted by NFIA and therefore dismissed).
66. Segall v. Rapkin, 875 F. Supp. 240, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
67. State Bank of Coloma v. Nat’l Flood Ins. Program, 851 F.2d 817, 820
(6th Cir. 1988) (“Congress, in creating the National Flood Insurance Program,
provided that claimants under the program could sue the government in
District Court. As we noted, such waivers of sovereign immunity must be
strictly construed.”).
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The Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform and
Modernization Act of 2012

A. The Bigger-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012
On July 6, 2012, President Obama signed the BiggertWaters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (“BW-12”) extending
the National Flood Insurance Program through September 30,
2017.68 BW-12 also made significant reforms including phasing
out subsidies for many properties, raising the cap on annual
premium increases from 10% to 20%, allowing multifamily
properties to purchase NFIP policies, imposing minimum
deductibles for flood claims, requiring the NFIP administrator
to develop a plan for repaying the debt incurred from Hurricane
Katrina, and establishing a technical mapping advisory council
to deal with map modernization issues.69
BW-12 began the elimination of five categories of property
to be excluded from receiving subsidized premium rates: (1)
residential property that is not the primary residence of an
individual; (2) any “severe repetitive loss” property; (3) property
that has incurred flood-related damage in which the cumulative
amounts of payments equaled or exceeded the fair market value
of that property; (4) business property; and, (5) any property that
on or after July 6, 2012, the date of enactment, has experienced
or sustained substantial damage exceeding 50% of its fair
market value or substantial improvement exceeding 30% of the
fair market value.70 Subsidies would be immediately phased out
for all new and lapsed policies and upon sale of the property.71
Additionally, new rules were established to make it easier to
apply for the FEMA buyout program.72 BW-12 also capped
68. Lori Widmer, What to Know About the New Flood Insurance Program,
INS.
J.
(July,
31,
2012),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2012/07/31/257675.htm.
69. Andrew G. Simpson, President Obama Signs Flood Insurance Reform
Bill,
INS.
J.
(July
9,
2012),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2012/07/09/254797.htm.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 4014(a)(2) (2012).
71. See FEMA, QUESTIONS ABOUT THE BIGGERT-WATERS FLOOD INSURANCE
REFORM ACT OF 2012 2 (2013), available at http://www.fema.gov/media-librarydata/20130726-1912-25045-9380/bw12_qa_04_2013.pdf.
72. Widmer, supra note 68.
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annual premium increases at 20%, a 10% raise over the previous
year’s cap.73
Changes were also made to WYO.
Under BW-12,
underwriters would receive an expense allowance equal to 30%
of premium.74 Agents would receive 15% commission, and the
NFIP picks up 13% of company expenses and 2% of state
premium tax.75 However, despite the desire of NFIP to transfer
some of the business to the private market, private insurers are
beginning to leave the NFIP’s WYO program.76 Some insurers
began jumping ship after 2008, when those 17 extensions of the
law and lack of any real change discouraged them.77 Most
notably, State Farm dropped its participation in the program, at
which time it was administering 829,273 policies.78 At the time,
the company cited extensions and expirations, as well as
procedural changes that forced too much of its resources to the
program as reasons for ending their participation in WYO.79
As noted above, BW-12 also reestablished the Technical
Mapping Advisory Council to make recommendations to FEMA
about how to update and improve Flood Insurance Rate Maps
(“FIRMs”).80
Additionally, BW-12 required FEMA, in
coordination with the Technical Mapping Advisory Council, to
create a program to constantly review, update, and maintain
NFIP rate maps.81 BW-12 ordered that when the flood maps
change, any property located in an area that is participating in
the NFIP will have the risk premium rate adjusted to accurately
reflect the current risk of flood to that property.82
BW-12 also required that the NFIP devise a schedule for

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. Recently, Traveler’s Insurance announced they would also be
ending their involvement in WYO. See Travelers to Exit NFIP’s Write-YourOwn
Program,
INS.
J.
(Aug.
23,
2013),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2013/08/23/302727.htm.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 4101a (2012).
81. Id. § 4101b(a).
82. Id. § 4015(h).
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repayment of the program’s debts83 and establishment of a
reserve fund.84 The reforms set forth in the new plan had the
Congressional Budget Office estimate a $2.7 billion increase in
net income over the next ten years.85 Still, Congress expected a
more aggressive plan for paying off the $18 billion still owed.86
The National Flood Insurance Reserve Fund was to be separated
from other accounts or funds and be available to meet future
obligations of the program including payment of claims, claims
adjustment expenses, and repayment of debt.87 A balance that
is equal to at least 1% of the total potential loss exposure of all
outstanding policies in force in the prior fiscal year is required
to be maintained by the reserve fund.88
B. Mississippi’s Lawsuit
Almost immediately the reforms were met with popular
disapproval. On October 1, 2013, FEMA began implementing
rate changes on policyholders whereby some individuals saw
flood insurance premiums increases more than ten-fold.89 States
and their elected officials began scrambling to stave off full rate
increases prior to their October 1, 2013 implementation. On
September 26, 2013, the Mississippi Department of Insurance
filed a lawsuit against the federal government to try to block
rates from increasing on October 1 in the NFIP.90
What drove Mississippi’s Department of Insurance to sue
before any other state was that BW-12 implemented a strategy
for remapping the country’s flood zones, and that remapping
83. Id. § 4016(c).
84. Id. § 4017a.
85. Widmer, supra note 68.
86. Id.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 4017a(a).
88. Id. § 4017a(b)(1).
89. See Lizette Alvarez & Campbell Robertson, Cost of Flood Insurance
Rises, Along with Worries, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2013, at A14 (“Wendy Lockhart
and her husband, who live in St. Pete Beach [Florida], a barrier island, said
they recently closed on a house not too far away. Just after they put their old
house on the market, they found out that for a buyer, the flood insurance rates
on that home would jump immediately to $8,500 a year from $800.”).
90. Emily Wagster Pettus, Mississippi Insurance Chief Sues to Halt Flood
Insurance
Rate
Hikes,
INS.
J.
(Sept.
29,
2013),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2013/09/29/306567.htm.
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appeared to have started with Mississippi.91 According to
FEMA, Mississippi and Louisiana were the first states to include
the post-Hurricane Katrina statistics in their rating
methodology.92 This meant that Mississippi’s citizens would pay
higher rates for many years before citizens of other states would
have been required to do likewise.93 However, Florida94,
Alabama95, Louisiana96, South Carolina97, and Massachusetts98
all filed amicus curiae briefs supporting Mississippi’s lawsuit.
Mississippi claimed that FEMA’s implementation of the
scheduled rate increases would be arbitrary and capricious
because FEMA had failed to conduct and complete various
studies as statutorily mandated by Congress in BW-12 prior to
making decisions determining flood insurance premium rate
changes.99 Among the most important studies for the purposes
of Mississippi’s argument was an “Affordability Study” which
read:
(a) FEMA Study.—The Administrator shall
conduct a study of—
...
91. First Amended Complaint, at 8, Miss. Ins. Dep’t v. U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., No. 1:13CV379 LG-JMR (S.D. Miss. Closed Apr. 14, 2014).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 9.
94. Florida, Alabama Officials Back Mississippi’s Suit Over Flood
Insurance,
INS.
J.
(NOV.
15,
2013),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2013/11/15/311397.htm.
95. Id.
96. Chevel Johnson, Louisiana Joins Lawsuit to Block Flood Insurance
Hike,
INS.
J.
(Dec.
2,
2013),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southcentral/2013/12/02/312712.htm.
97. Tyrone Richardson, South Carolina Supports Mississippi’s Lawsuit
Against Flood Insurance Rate Increases, POST & COURIER (Nov. 8, 2013),
http://www.postandcourier.com/article/20131108/PC05/131109423.
98. Mass. AG Files Federal Brief Urging Court Action on Flood Insurance,
INS.
J.
(Nov.
18,
2013),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/east/2013/11/18/311563.htm.
99. First Amended Complaint, supra note 91, at 10-15, 20-23. Studies to
be conducted included: (1) Report on Improving the NFIP; (2) Report of the
Administrator on Activities Under the NFIP; (3) GAO Study on Pre-FIRM
Structures; (4) GAO Review of FEMA Contractors; (5) Study and Report on
Graduated Risk; (6) Interagency Coordination Study; (7) GAO Study on
Business Interruption and Additional Living Expenses Coverages; and (8)
Report on Inclusion of Building Codes in Floodplain Management Criteria. Id.

15

2015

THICKER THAN WATER

1065

(3) methods for establishing an affordability
framework for the National Flood Insurance
Program, including methods to aid individuals to
afford risk-based premiums under the National
Flood Insurance Program through targeted
assistance rather than generally subsidized rates,
including means-tested vouchers; (emphasis
added) and
(4) the implications for the National Flood
Insurance Program and the Federal budget of
using each such method.
...
(c) Report.—Not later than 270 days after the date
of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall
submit to the Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the
Committee on Financial Services of the House of
Representatives a report that contains the results
of the study and analysis under this section.
(d) Funding.—Notwithstanding section 1310 of
the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (42
U.S.C. 4017), there shall be available to the
Administrator from the National Flood Insurance
Fund, of amounts not otherwise obligated, not
more than $ 750,000 to carry out this section.100
Mississippi argued that since the over-arching purpose of
the NFIP is to provide affordable flood insurance in high-risk
areas,101 FEMA’s actions were arbitrary and capricious because
FEMA was proceeding without considering much of the relevant
necessary evidence which Congress had expressly identified and
directed FEMA and the Comptroller of the Currency and others
to furnish to Congress sufficiently in advance of October 1, 2013
to make necessary changes and corrections to BW-12.102

100. Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112141, § 100236, 126 Stat. 405, 957 (2012).
101. First Amended Complaint, supra note 91, at 9-10.
102. Id. at 24.
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Mississippi sought declaratory judgment stating that FEMA did
not yet have the information that was required in order to make
rating decisions and would not have such information until the
mandated studies (including those addressing the key issue of
“affordability”) are obtained and meaningfully reviewed by
FEMA, that the rate changes are not on “reasonable terms” and
therefore, contrary to the congressionally-stated intent behind
the NFIP, and that FEMA could not move forward until the
mandated studies were completed.103 Mississippi also sought
injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedures Act
(“APA”) on the basis that FEMA’s failure to complete the
mandatory obligations imposed during the first year after the
passage of BW-12 were multiple, discrete agency inactions or
failures to act which mandate a judicial decree under the APA
requiring FEMA to deliver the required reports to Congress and
enter into the various contracts and consulting relationships
with third parties all before any rate increases are
implemented.104 Mississippi’s entire argument for the studies
being mandatory hinged upon the use of the word “shall” in the
statutory language of BW-12.105
C.

Analysis and FEMA’s Response

FEMA filed a motion to dismiss responding that Congress
never intended the studies to be completed before
implementation of rate changes.106 The Supreme Court has
ruled that agencies are given broad discretion in determining
whether or not to act in certain instances. In Heckler v. Chaney,
prison inmates in California brought suit to compel the FDA to
103. Id. at 26.
104. Id. at 31.
105. Id. at 34 (“The other provisions of BW-12 cited and discussed
previously all contain ‘shall’ as mandatory language which FEMA has not
complied with.”) (emphasis added).
106. Brief for Defendant, at 11, Miss. Ins. Dep’t v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., No. 1:13CV379 LG-JMR (S.D. Miss. Closed Apr. 14, 2014) (“[T]o complete
the affordability study required by Section 236 will do nothing to redress the
injuries Plaintiff alleges Mississippi residents are suffering. . . . This is because
the plain language of subsections 205(e), 205(a)(1)(B) (42 U.S.C. § 4014(g)(1)(2)), and 205(a)(2) explicitly mandate when the premiums must be phased out
or eliminated, without regard to any other action that BW-12 directs FEMA to
undertake.”) (citations omitted).
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take enforcement action under a law with respect to drugs used
for lethal injections to carry out capital punishment.107 The
Supreme Court in Heckler held that the presumption of
unreviewability of decisions of an agency not to undertake
enforcement action was not overcome by the prison inmates.108
In Heckler, the Supreme Court noted that there is a presumption
that an agency’s refusal to investigate or enforce is within the
agency’s discretion, unless Congress has indicated otherwise. 109
This presumption of agency discretion can be overcome if
Congress indicates that a decision or act is not discretionary.110
Importantly, the Supreme Court’s decision in Heckler applies to
both agency matters of enforcement and investigation.111 When
discussing why agency determinations should not normally be
reviewed the Supreme Court said:
[A]n agency decision not to enforce often involves
a complicated balancing of a number of factors
which are peculiarly within its expertise. Thus,
the agency must not only assess whether a
violation has occurred, but whether agency
resources are best spent on this violation or
another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if
it acts, whether the particular enforcement action
requested best fits the agency’s overall policies,
and, indeed, whether the agency has enough
resources to undertake the action at all. An
agency generally cannot act against each
technical violation of the statute it is charged with
enforcing. The agency is far better equipped than
the courts to deal with the many variables
involved in the proper ordering of its priorities.
Similar concerns animate the principles of
107. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
108. Id. at 838.
109. Id.
110. Id. (“The general exception to reviewability provided by § 701(a)(2)
for action ‘committed to agency discretion’ remains a narrow one, . . . but within
that exception are included agency refusals to institute investigative or
enforcement proceedings, unless Congress has indicated otherwise.”) (citations
omitted).
111. Id.
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administrative law that courts generally will
defer to an agency’s construction of the statute it
is charged with implementing, and to the
procedures it adopts for implementing that
statute.112
The courts have also had occasion to discuss whether the
use of the word “shall” creates an affirmative duty on behalf of
agencies to carry out statutorily prescribed actions. In Sierra
Club v. Whitman, the EPA was sued by citizens and the Sierra
Club alleging that EPA failed to take action upon alleged Clean
Water Act (“CWA”) violations by operators of a wastewater
treatment plant.113 The CWA provides that, whenever “the
Administrator finds that any person is in violation” of permit
conditions, the Administrator “shall issue an order requiring
such person to comply . . . or . . . shall bring a civil action” against
the violator.114 Much the same as Mississippi’s argument
against FEMA, the Sierra Club relied heavily on the use of the
word “shall” in the CWA as forming the basis for mandatory
agency action.115
However, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Sierra Club’s
contention that the presence of “shall” in the CWA created a
mandatory duty for EPA to investigate or take enforcement
action.116 The Court began by recognizing that “shall” in a
statute generally denotes a mandatory duty.117 However, the
use of “shall” is not conclusive.118 Particularly when used in a
statute that prospectively affects government action, “shall” is
sometimes the equivalent of “may.”119 The question whether
“shall” commands or merely authorizes is determined by the
objectives of the statute.120
112. Id. at 831-32.
113. Sierra Club v. Whitman, 268 F.3d 898, 900 (9th Cir. 2001).
114. Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3) (2012)).
115. Id. at 904 (“It is this language, and especially the word ‘shall,’ upon
which the Sierra Club principally relies.”).
116. Id. at 903-04.
117. Id. (citing Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146 (2001)).
118. Id. at 904 (citing Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493 (1935)).
119. Id. (citing Richbourg Motor Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 528, 534
(1930)).
120. Id. (citing Escoe, 95 U.S. at 493).
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The objective of BW-12 was to bring the NFIP back to
financial solvency by employing actuarial principles in
determining flood insurance rates. This is evident through the
removal of subsidies as outlined above. While Congress put
certain, varying deadlines in place for FEMA to complete a wide
array of studies, it could not be said that Congress required
FEMA to base any rate changes upon the findings of those
studies.
Specifically, the text of BW-12 related to the
Affordability Study (reproduced above) says nothing that
requires FEMA to tie any findings from the study to any new
flood insurance rates that are meant to reflect actuarial risk.
BW-12 merely says:
Not later than 270 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall
submit to the Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the
Committee on Financial Services of the House of
Representatives a report that contains the results
of the study and analysis under this section.121
Clearly absent from this section was any indication that
Congress intended to require FEMA to incorporate into its
analysis the results of this study (or any other study) in
determining new flood insurance premium rates which were
primarily meant to show actuarial risk of flooding. All the
statute said regarding the study was that it was to be delivered
to certain congressional and Senate committees. Viewing
Mississippi’s claim under the Chaney framework and the Ninth
Circuit’s analysis in Sierra Club v. Whitman it is obvious that
FEMA would be accorded deference in determining the rate
changes before the studies were completed.
In Guerrero v. Clinton the Governments of the Territory of
Guam, the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, and
State of Hawaii brought suit challenging the failure of the
Director of Office of Insular Affairs to issue a report to Congress
annually as required by the Compact of Free Association Act of
121. Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112141, § 100236, 126 Stat. 405, 957 (2012).
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1985.122 In ruling that the report did not need to be completed
and transmitted to Congress, the Ninth Circuit in Guerrero said:
Submitting a § 1904(e)(2) report does not cause
Congress to “act sympathetically,” nor is it in any
way the sine quo non to receiving Compact aid.
Instead, it is purely informational. Although a
more detailed report or a report that highlights
impact more emphatically might have a better
chance of getting some member of Congress’s
attention, it carries no greater clout than that. . .
In sum, no legal consequences flow from a §
1904(e)(2) report and it has no “determinative or
coercive effect upon the action of someone else”123
In the Mississippi lawsuit, FEMA argued that the reports were
meant to be only informational in nature. In requiring FEMA to
only deliver the studies to Congress it could not be logically
concluded that Congress intended FEMA to base any rate
changes off the conclusions of those studies.124
An additional argument that FEMA advanced in its brief in
support of its motion to dismiss was that the Mississippi
Department of Insurance lacked standing to sue FEMA for the
rate changes. FEMA argued that Supreme Court precedent

122. Guerrero v. Clinton, 157 F.3d 1190, 1191 (9th Cir. 1998).
123. Id. at 1194-95 (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997)).
124. It should be noted that FEMA attempted to complete the study in the
timeframe laid out in BW-12. As FEMA noted in their brief:
In February 2013, FEMA began discussions with NAS
[National Academy of Science] and others regarding the
requirements for the affordability study. . . . All parties
concluded that additional time and funding were needed to
complete the full scope of work contemplated in Section 236.
. . . On April 18, 2013, FEMA received a letter from NAS
explaining that NAS could not complete its analysis under
the time and funding constraints provided for in BW-12. . . .
After receiving the letter from NAS in April of 2013, FEMA
formally notified Congress of the delays, as well as funding
constraints, in completing the affordability study.
Brief for Defendant, supra note 106, at 8-9 (citations omitted).
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forecloses a State agency from suing the federal government on
behalf of the State’s citizens to protect those citizens from the
operation of federal law.125 Therefore, argued FEMA, any
attempt to rely on the injuries of Mississippi citizens and thereby
characterize this action as one in parens patriae126 had to be
rejected.127
FEMA argued that the Supreme Court had made clear that
a State cannot bring a parens patriae action against federal
defendants to protect a state’s citizens from the operation of
federal statutes.128 In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the Supreme
Court stressed that “it is no part of [a state’s] duty or power to
enforce [its citizens’] rights in respect of their relations with the
federal government;” “it is the United States, and not the state,
which represents [its citizens] as parens patriae.”129
However, the Supreme Court has also established the right
of a State to sue as parens patriae to prevent or repair harm to
its “quasi-sovereign” interests.130 These interests deal primarily
with original suits brought directly in the Supreme Court
pursuant to Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution under
common-law rights of action.131 The key characteristic in these
suits are that they are lawsuits between states or between states
and private entities.132 In order to properly invoke this
125. Id. at 15
126. The doctrine of parens patriae (literally meaning “parent of his
country”) says a government has standing to prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of
a citizen, especially on behalf of someone who is under a legal disability to
prosecute the suit. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
127. Brief for Defendant, supra note 106, at 15.
128. Id. at 11 (citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86
(1923)).
129. Id.
130. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 258 (1972).
131. Id. at 258-59.
132. The Court in Standard Oil noted:
This Court's acceptance of the notion of parens patriae suits
in Louisiana v. Texas was followed in a series of cases:
Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901) (holding that
Missouri was permitted to sue Illinois and a Chicago
sanitation district on behalf of Missouri citizens to enjoin the
discharge of sewage into the Mississippi River); Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (holding that Kansas was
permitted to sue as parens patriae to enjoin the diversion of

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/7

22

1072

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35:3

jurisdiction, the State must bring an action on its own behalf and
not on behalf of particular citizens.133
The Supreme Court in Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto
Rico, ex rel., Barez also explained that there are no “definitive
limits on the proportion of the population of the State that must
be adversely affected by the challenged behavior” in order to
support a parens patriae action; rather such a determination
turns on whether a “sufficiently substantial segment of [the
State’s] population” is affected by the direct and indirect effects
of the alleged injury.134 Additionally, after admitting that this
term “quasi-sovereign” is vague, the Supreme Court in Snapp
wrote that “a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health
and well-being—both physical and economic—of its residents in
general.”135
The question in the FEMA lawsuit was if those citizens of
Mississippi, and only those citizens, who were to be negatively
impacted by changes in NFIP flood insurance rates rose to the
level of a “sufficiently substantial segment of [the State’s]
population” as identified in Snapp. After all, in Mississippi, 14%
of flood insurance policies are subsidized, according to the
NFIP.136 Both residents of Mississippi who do not partake in the
NFIP and 86% of flood insurance policyholders would go

water from an interstate stream); Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (holding that Georgia was
entitled to sue to enjoin fumes from a copper plant across the
state border from injuring land in five Georgia counties);
People of State of New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296
(1921) (holding that New York could sue to enjoin the
discharge of sewage into the New York harbor); Pennsylvania
v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (holding that
Pennsylvania might sue to enjoin restraints on the
commercial flow of natural gas); and North Dakota v.
Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923) (holding that Minnesota
could sue to enjoin changes in drainage which increase the
flow of water in an interstate stream).
Id. at 258.
133. Id. at 258 n.12.
134. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592,
607 (1982).
135. Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418, 426 (5th
Cir. 2008) (quoting Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607).
136. Pettus, supra note 90.
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unaffected by any rate changes. Therefore, assuming arguendo,
that Mississippi would be permitted to sue the federal
government for its citizens, the question became if Mississippi’s
lawsuit violated a basic tenant of the parens patriae doctrine
because the state’s legal action was on behalf of a particular,
subset of citizens.
Namely, the 14% of flood insurance
policyholders having subsidized NFIP policies. An additional
question that had to be considered was if protecting cheap,
subsidized flood insurance for 14% of flood insurance
policyholder in Mississippi qualified as a quasi-sovereign
interest in the health and well-being of Mississippi’s residents
in general.
Lastly, as FEMA argued, Mississippi could not demonstrate
that it had standing to challenge BW-12 because it has failed to
identify an injury it had suffered from the statute.137 As the
Supreme Court noted in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife:
Over the years, our cases have established that
the irreducible constitutional minimum of
standing contains three elements. First, the
plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—
an invasion of a legally protected interest which is
(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) “actual or
imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical,’
Second, there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained
of—the injury has to be “fairly . . . trace[able] to
the challenged action of the defendant, and not . .
. th[e] result [of] the independent action of some
third party not before the court.” Third, it must be
“likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that
the injury will be “redressed by a favorable
decision.” 138
The only allegations of injury found in Mississippi’s
Amended Complaint were allegations of injury to Mississippi

137. Brief for Defendant, supra note 106, at 10.
138. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (citations
omitted).
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NFIP policyholders.139 Taken together, FEMA claimed, it was
obvious that Mississippi lacked the standing to bring the lawsuit
and even if they had been able to show an injury or bring a
legitimate claim under parens patriae it is evident that, given
the statutory construct of BW-12 and case law, FEMA was not
required to complete the affordability study prior to instituting
any rate changes.
D. Politics as Usual
The Court did not have an opportunity to rule in this
critically important case. Rather, in a crass display of electionyear politicking, Congress passed, and President Obama signed
into law, the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of
The President’s signature
2014 on March 21, 2014.140
culminated a nearly two-year effort to combat large premium
increases for some of the 5.5 million flood insurance
policyholders.141 The Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability
Act limits yearly premium increases to an average of 15% per
year for each of the nine property categories listed by FEMA,
and stipulates that no individual policyholder pay an increase of
more than 18% per year.142 It calls on FEMA to “strive” to reach
the goal that most policyholders have a premium of no more than
1% of the value of their coverage—in other words, $2,000 for a
$200,000 policy.143
The legislation offers its greatest relief to owners of
properties that were originally built to code but subsequently
were found to be at greater flood risk.144 Such “grandfathered”
homeowners currently benefit from below-market rates that are
subsidized by other policyholders, and the new legislation
139. Brief for Defendant, supra note 106, at 11.
140. Bruce Alpert, President Obama Signs Flood Insurance Bill into Law,
TIMES-PICAYUNE
(Mar.
21,
2014),
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/03/do_not_run_president_obama_
sig.html.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Nedra Pickler, President Obama Signs Flood Insurance Relief Bill,
INS.
J.
(Mar.
24,
2014),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2014/03/24/324217.htm.
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preserves that status and caps premium increases at 18% a
year.145 Another provision, eagerly sought by the real estate
industry, allows sellers of older homes built before original flood
insurance risk maps were drafted to pass taxpayer-subsidized
policies on to the people buying their homes instead of requiring
purchasers to pay actuarially sound rates immediately, as
required by the 2012 law.146
As a result of the legislation, the Mississippi Department of
Insurance entered a voluntary notice of dismissal without
prejudice on April 14, 2014.147
However, Insurance
Commissioner Chaney said he would refile the lawsuit against
FEMA if the latest changes in the flood program prove to be
unsatisfactory.148 FEMA will therefore implement the new 2014
legislation knowing that elected officials and policyholders in
flood-prone States are watching closely.
It is no wonder the timing of the reform bill, passed just
weeks before Congress was set to begin a two-week spring recess
and a month-long summer recess later in August.149 The reform
bill passed by wide margins with support coming from both
parties. The bill passed the House of Representatives on March
4, 2014 with 306 yeas, 91 nays, and 33 not voting.150 Of the yeas,
126 were Republicans and 180 were Democrats.151 On March 13,
2014 the bill passed the United States Senate with 72 yeas, 22
nays, and 6 not voting.152 On the Senate side, the yeas were
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Michael Adams, Mississippi Withdrawing Lawsuit Over Flood
Insurance
Rates,
INS.
J.
(Apr.
17,
2014),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2014/04/17/326698.htm.
148. Id.
149. Billy House, For House, 2014 Will Be a Busy Year—Away From
Washington,
NAT’L
J.
(Oct.
31,
2013),
http://www.nationaljournal.com/congress/for-house-2014-will-be-a-busy-yearaway-from-washington-20131031 (“There's a nearly two week spring break in
April, and then lawmakers will be out of session for the entire month of August
and beyond – extending into first full week of September, which includes Labor
Day.”).
150. Final Vote Results for Roll Call on Motion to Suspend Rules and Pass,
as Amended, Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, OFFICE OF
CLERK
OF
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES
(2014),
available
at
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2014/roll091.xml.
151. Id.
152. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 113th Congress – 2nd Session on Passage
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comprised of 51 Democrats and 21 Republicans.153 The bipartisan support for the bill shows just how volatile an issue
flood insurance reform is in the 2014 midterm election cycle.
The issue undoubtedly cuts across party lines and ideology.154
IV. Weaker Than the Shore
The Mississippi lawsuit, which as of this writing has been
terminated, was an opportunity snatched away from the courts
to come down on the side of the reasoned decision-making of
FEMA to allow the NFIP to bring itself back to fiscal sanity.
However, even though the reforms of 2014 rolled back
significant portions of BW-12, FEMA is still granted authority
to raise rates as high as 18% a year. But if the court in the
Mississippi lawsuit had been given the opportunity to grant
FEMA’s motion to dismiss there would have been a clear
opportunity for FEMA to put the NFIP on the road to solvency
using a broader range of tools to implement rate changes, revise
flood maps, and remove subsidies that reflect actuarial risks for
properties in floodplains across America. However, election year
politics proved too strong a factor.
V. Conclusion
While the increased rates were politically unpopular, the
NFIP is currently running at a $25 billion deficit.155 The next
major storm will assuredly put it deeper into debt. The NFIP
of the Bill (H.R. 3370), SEC’Y OF U.S. SENATE (2014), available at
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?&c
ongress=113&session=2&vote=00078.
153. Id. The Senators from Mississippi, Louisiana, Florida, South
Carolina, New Jersey, New York, and Massachusetts voted Yea. Senator Jeff
Sessions of Alabama voted Yea, while Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama
voted Nay. Id.
154. Indeed, the bill was sponsored by Congressman Michal Grimm (RNY) and Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ). See H.R. 3370 (113th): Homeowner
Flood
Insurance
Affordability
Act
of
2014,
GOVTRACK.US,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr3370 (last visited Apr. 10, 2015);
S. 1610 (113th): Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2013,
GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s1610 (last visited
Apr. 10, 2015).
155. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 5.
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will never be solvent without serious changes. One scientific
organization has noted that rising sea levels have contributed to
shoreline erosion and degradation and raises flooding risks from
extra-high tides.156 States with large areas of low-lying land
(such as California, Florida, Louisiana, North Carolina, and
South Carolina) or states with large populations living on lowlying land (such as California, Florida, Louisiana, and New
York) are particularly vulnerable.157 A rise of approximately two
feet above today’s sea level by 2100 would put more than $1
trillion of property and structures in the United States at risk of
inundation, with roughly half of that value concentrated in
Florida.158
Not only will things not get better for the NFIP, they will
get substantially worse.
The growing pace of coastal
development puts more people and property in the path of
coastal storms, flooding, inundation, and erosion.159 Rising
property values in many places along ocean coastlines also mean
that, in the event of devastating storms, damage costs are
growing.160 More and more people moving into coastal areas and
seeking to purchase flood insurance at below-market rates with
increasing probabilities of flooding due to rising sea levels and
stronger weather events is a recipe for disaster for the NFIP. It
almost guarantees the NFIP will forever be a budgetary black
hole of the United States. Although FEMA is in the process of
updating FIRMs, FIRMs in some communities flood maps are
still out of date and have not been updated, in some cases, since
the 1980’s.161 Mapping practices also do not account for
156. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, OVERWHELMING RISK: RETHINKING
FLOOD INSURANCE IN A WORLD OF RISING SEAS 3 (2013), available at
http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/global_war
ming/Overwhelming-Risk-Full-Report.pdf.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 4.
160. Id.
161. JESSICA GRANNIS, GEO. CLIMATE CENTER, ANALYSIS OF HOW THE
FLOOD INSURANCE REFORM ACT OF 2012 (H.R. 4348) MAY AFFECT STATE AND
LOCAL
ADAPTATION
EFFORTS
5
(2012),
available
at
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/academic-programs/clinicalprograms/ourclinics/HIP/upload/GCC_Analysis-of-the-Flood-Insurance-Reform-Act-of2012_8-14-12.pdf.
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increased flood risks as a result climate change, sea-level rise, or
even increased impervious coverage due to land use changes.162
As a result, FIRMs may be inaccurate at predicting both the
geographic extent of flooding and flood heights communities will
face in the future.163 Indeed, after Hurricane Katrina, it was
discovered that large portion of the Biloxi, Mississippi area was
not considered to be, according to 1981 maps, in a special hazard
After the maps were updated, several excluded
zone.164
properties were then placed in the special hazard zone.165
There have been some changes without the needed reforms
to the NFIP, such as President Barack Obama issuing an
executive order directing all government agencies handing out
federal aid to incorporate stricter building requirements that
take sea-level rise into account.166 Additionally, on the New
Jersey Shore, any home in a flood zone that was declared
substantially damaged — meaning it would cost 50% or more of
the home’s pre-damage market value to restore — must be
rebuilt to current standards, which may require elevating the
property.167
However, these directives and regulations are not enough.
The ability to increase rates, albeit capped, and the reworking of
flood maps is an opportunity for our coastal communities to take
real ownership over the problem of increasing effects of flooding
and have an honest conversation on this issue. Implementing
actuarial principles in the NFIP will incentivize coastal
communities to construct more wisely and take larger
preventive measures to combat flooding. Presently, artificially
low flood insurance rates have created a vicious cycle of risky
development near land’s end. Implementing actuarial principles
meaningfully in the NFIP’s determination of flood insurance
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Widmer, supra note 68.
165. Id.
166. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Executive
Order – Establishing a Federal Flood Risk Management Standard and a
Process for Further Soliciting and Considering Stakeholder Input (Jan. 30,
2015),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/01/30/executive-order-establishing-federal-flood-riskmanagement-standard-and-.
167. Ronda Kaysen, Back to the Shore, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2014, at RE1.

29

2015

THICKER THAN WATER

1079

rates and revising flood maps to reflect current sea-levels and
weather conditions will not only bring the NFIP back from fiscal
disaster, it will also allow our coastal communities to work
together with their local, state, and federal governments in
devising real ways to combat rising sea-levels and harsh
weather events through mitigation and prevention.
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